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THE ECONOMICS OF DISAMENITY
E. J. MISHAN*
While expert information on all relevant consequences of any
hazard or disamenity is to be encouraged if only because it enables
the citizen better to appraise the risks to which he is exposed, or is
exposing himself, the determination by experts of norms of social
tolerance is always suspect. Certainly the concept of a "tolerable
degree" of noise, or for that matter, of stench or pollution or fume, is
one that is not acceptable to the liberal economist. It may well be
that a particular upper limit for the level of noise does preclude
ascertainable physical damage, notwithstanding which, noise below
that level can be highly irritating to a lot of people. If a man were
subjected at frequent intervals to the gentlest tap on the back of his
head, his mounting exasperation would not surprise us. Neither the
fact that he was left without bruises nor the statement that this effect
was, in some explicable way, an unavoidable by-product of the
operation of modem industry, is likely to persuade us that the
practice was reasonable. The occasional or frequent bombarding of a
man's ears with noise differs only in our being more accustomed to it.
If the liberal economist rejects the concept of a tolerance level then,
it is not simply because such a level is subjective and necessarily
arbitrary, scientific standards of measurement are also vulnerable in
these respects, but because any adoption of norms of tolerance on
behalf of society runs counter to the traditional liberal doctrine that
each man is deemed to be the best judge of his own interest.
This doctrine is, however, more eagerly defended when a man is
regarded as a consumer of the products of industry. The mere
suggestion, say, that a certain number of luxury goods, admittedly not
necessary to the good life, be withdrawn from production would
provoke an outcry. Economists are well to the fore even if the issue is
no more than that of offering the consumer a cheaper price by
removing import restrictions. In contrast, when man is regarded as an
agent of production he can be deprived of choice, impelled to switch
to less congenial methods of work, or retired from his post, without
the economist showing undue concern. And this despite the fact that a
man's welfare is more heavily dependent on his circumstances as a
worker than on his circumstances as a consumer. As a citizen, also, he
can apparently be robbed of choice in things that matter crucially to
his welfare without offering much resistance. An originally peaceful
and pleasant environment can be eroded over the years without his
consent and often without his protest. For men tend to view the
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surrounding environment much as they do the weather, as a
phenomenon to which they can perhaps adapt but which, in itself, is
outside their control.
Such an attitude is not justifiable. Some framework of law is
necessary if markets are to function in an orderly fashion and trade is
to flourish. But not all laws are equally effective in harmonizing the
search for commercial gain with the welfare of society. The economist interested in social welfare or, more simply, in extending the
area of choice to individuals, can do more than offer suggestions to
promote a smoother functioning of economic mechanisms or to
improve allocative efficiency. At a time of rapid deterioration of the
environment he can suggest radical alterations of the legal framework
itself as offering significant contributions to the social welfare.
The question of disamenities in general is pertinent here. They give
rise to particular economic difficulties inasmuch as they are incidental
to the production and consumption of ordinary goods while also being
costly to avoid. If, notwithstanding these difficulties, something can be
done about them within the existing system of laws, much more can
be done about them by changing the system.
DEFINITION OF EXTERNAL EFFECTS
External effects, frequently referred to as "spillovers" or "spillover
effects," first appear as external economics in Marshall's Principles in
connection with a competitive industry's downward sloping supply
curve. Put briefly, Marshall's argument was that if, as the industry
expands, the economies made possible by an additional firm are
enjoyed by all the intra-marginal firms also, the incremental cost of
the output of the additional firm will be below the costs borne by that
firm by an amount equal to the total saving of the intra-marginal
firms. If the industry's output is determined at the point where market
demand price is equal to average inclusive cost, it would be "too
small." The correct output would be reached by constructing a supply
curve marginal to the industry's supply curve, choosing an output at
which demand price is equal to the marginal cost of the industry. This
concept of external economies was extended to diseconomies, and
both external economies and diseconomies were seen to apply not
only as between firms within an industry, but as between industries
within the economy. Moreover, these external effects were not
confined to firms or industries; they could take place between persons
or groups and, more pertinent to our inquiry, between industries or
firms and persons.
Thinking in terms of the impact, say, of noise, or smoke on other
firms or on the public at large, one is prone to describe an external
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effect in terms of the response of a firm's production or a person's
utility to the activity of others. But the statement that a firm's output
or a person's utility can be influenced by the activity of others can
apparently be true within the context of any general equilibrium
system. The equilibrium set of prices that emerge from such a system
is the result of the combined economic behavior patterns of individuals along with the distribution of given factor endowments and
technical knowledge. Any exogenous change, say an alteration in the
behavior of one or more persons, is able in principle to change the
equilibrium set of prices, thereby affecting the utility levels of all
people and the outputs of all products.
Notwithstanding this Walrasian interdependence, an equilibrium
reached by universally perfect competition (possible with production
functions that are everywhere homogeneous of degree one) is, it is
believed, consistent with Pareto optimum. Any exogenous change in
such a system simply moves the economy from one Pareto optimum
to another, and these alternative optima cannot be ranked in the
absence of some social welfare function.
In contrast, the equilibrium reached by universal competition in
the presence of external effects is not, in general, consistent with a
Pareto optimum. The equilibrium reached being non-optimal, implying that some can be made better off without others being made any
worse, the economist feels justified in calling for the corrections
necessary to attain optimum. One is, therefore, compelled to recognize that the essential condition for the existence of an external effect
is not simply that the total output of a good or a person's total utility
depends upon the behavior of others, which, as stated above, is true in
all general equilibrium systems,1 but that the shape of the relevant
production function itself, or the consumption function itself, depends
directly on the activity of others.
The necessary condition for an external effect on A to arise is,
whether A is a person, or a firm or an industry, and whether the
function is therefore a utility or a production function, the quantities
absorbed or produced by others. For other writers, the definition of an
external effect turns on welfare or production effects that are wholly
or partially unpriced. For yet other writers, the definition is broader
yet and comprehends any feature believed to deter the system from
attaining optimality.
Definitions are, in the last resort, arbitrary, but they achieve
currency as they serve the purpose of communication and as they
facilitate analysis. My present position is that of adopting the notional
1. Except in those special cases in which all production functions and all consumption
functions are homogeneous and identical.
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definition in which person A's utility function (or firm A's production
function) is affected by variables over which B, but not A, has control.
At the same time, and in accordance with the popular conception, I
interpret it as an effect on A's welfare (or firm A's output) produced
only incidentally by B in pursuit of some legitimate activity.
The external effect, or spillover, then, ceases to be one when it is no
longer incidentally produced by B, and uncontrolled by A; i.e., when
it becomes internalized either by a merger of A and B or through the
pricing system. The question of "correct" pricing is still relevant if we
are interested in optimal allocation. But we can still maintain that
once taken into account, through the merger or through the price
system, it ceases to be an external effect. It is taken into account by
both A and B. To require that it be priced "correctly" before moving
it from the category of external effects is to discriminate restrictively
against such an effect. The value of any commodities and discommodities is also improperly priced, as a result of monopoly, monopsony,
misinformation, and taxes. And clearly the fact will have a bearing on
resource allocation. Yet these commodities and discommodities are
generally regarded as being internal, or endogenous, to the economic
system. They may then be somewhat over- or under-valued, notwithstanding which, they are bought and sold, and otherwise enter the
calculus.
IMPLEMENTING THE OPTIMAL CONDITIONS
The economist's interest in spillover effects is directed in the main
to those that vary positively with the outputs of specific sorts of goods.
We shall confine this interest further to external effects running "one
way," from one industry to another or from industry to the general
public. We shall not elaborate the conclusions for reciprocal spillover
effects, these arising from the activities of each of two groups, each
spillover effect falling on the other group. Since we are concerned
here with spillover effects arising from the operation of some industry
on the public at large, we shall develop the analysis within the more
popular context of non-reciprocal spillover effects that vary positively
with output.
The "traditional" remedy for such spillovers is the tax-subsidy one,
associated with the great work of Pigou. The simplest proposal is that
of imposing an excise tax on the output, or of offering an excise
subsidy for reductions of output, of a good that generates an adverse
spillover effect. Per contra, for a good that generates a favorable
spillover effect the proposal is for an excise subsidy on its output or for
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an excise tax on all units beyond equilibrium by which output falls
2
short of optimum.
Several minor structures can be readily granted:
(1) There is the depressing second-best theorem which says
that connecting one or several sectors for spillovers or other
imperfections cannot be sure of improving the economic position
as a whole-apparently it is "all or nothing." However, under
realistic conditions, the curtailment of sectors generating substantial spillover effects can be justified.
(2) If an optimal excise tax is imposed on the output of a
polluting industry and the tax proceeds are not handed over to the
pollution victims, there is an incentive for the latter to bribe the
owners of the industry to reduce output still further. If they do so,
however, the resulting output becomes smaller than optimal.
Clearly the government has to take measures to prevent this
happening.
(3) Pigou, it is sometimes alleged, failed to make explicit the
duality of the tax-subsidy remedy. It should be manifest, however,
that the government, instead of imposing a tax on the production
of each unit of a good equal to the cost of the damage arising from
it, could just as well have offered an excise subsidy calculated in
the same way but one paid to the industry for each unit
withdrawn from production.
The duality of the negotiated solution should also be made
explicit. In the absence of an injunction prohibiting the damaging
spillover, the victims, as indicated above, have an incentive to
bribe the industry to contract its output. If, however, such
spillovers were instead prohibited by law (though being allowed
by law if all parties affected agreed to bear with them) the firm
could successfully bribe the victims with its profit per unit, thus
enabling it to produce a smaller output than before, which,
however, would also be an optimal output.
(4) Not enough attention was paid to the costs of collecting the
information necessary to estimate the costs of the spillovers, and
to make all the administrative arrangements incidental to securing
the optimal output through taxes or subsidies. If such costs
unavoidably incurred in attaining an optimal output happen to
exceed the hypothetical (costless) net benefit obtained by the
movement to optimal output, there will be in fact a residual loss
in moving to the optimal output. Analogous remarks apply in the
negotiated solution: the actual costs of reaching agreement may
well exceed the hypothetical (costless) net benefit.
2. Actually, conventional tax-subsidy symmetries-reducing market output by excise subsidies; increasing market output by excise taxes-are not feasible in competitive industries, unless
the government deals with each of the existing firms separately.
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(5) Again, not enough attention was given to spillover remedies other than that of correcting outputs. Preventive devices, the
movement of part of the industry, or part of the affected
populations, might well offer less costly alternatives.
Until recently the consensus among economists arising from
consideration of the above points was somewhat complacent and can
be summarized as follows:
(a) That the optimal position was uniquely determined irrespective of any legislation concerning the responsibility for
spillover. Whether the law was permissive with respect to the
specific spillover and the curtailment of output through an excise
subsidy was the more appropriate measure, or whether the
government frowned on spillovers and was therefore inclined to
impose excise taxes, was held to be a matter of indifference so far
as allocation was concerned. Similarly, in the absence of government intervention, if the victims of spillover bribed the manufacturers to reduce output, or, alternatively, the manufacturers were
compelled to compensate the victims, the resulting output would
be the same, and optimal, in both cases-always ignoring the
possibility that the costs of agreement and administration might
exceed the net benefits. One concluded that the question of who
compensated whom in such conflicts of interest had no bearing on
the allocative problem.
(b) Nor apparently could this matter of who should compensate whom be settled by considerations of equity. If, for example,
the smoke produced in the manufacture of soap damages the
interests of the inhabitants living within the locality of the soap
works, so also does the curtailment of soap output (or the
compulsory installation of anti-smoke devices) damage the interests of the manufacturer. The interests of the two parties are
mutually antagonistic, and only the misuse of3 semantics can
detract from the symmetry with respect to equity.
(c) Whether the problem of compensation was to be resolved
one way or another, or whether a tax or a subsidy was deemed the
more appropriate corrective, made a difference only in the
resulting distribution of welfare. More controversial is the view
that a potential Pareto improvement-an excess of gains over
losses (using the market prices)-is a sufficient criterion for an
economic improvement. This criterion, however, is implicit in
cost-benefit analysis. The criterion implies that any alteration in
the distribution of welfare resulting from its implementation can
3. This view seems to have arisen from too exclusive an attention to spillovers as between
firms, where it is more plausible, though it has been thoughtlessly extended to cases involving
disamenities.
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only be the subject of political judgments from which the
economist is absolved.
(d) Finally, whatever the legal position, the party suffering
from damages, under permissive law, the spillover victims, and
under prohibitive law, the manufacturers, has a clear interest in
trying to bribe the other party (the law permitting) to modify the
initial "uncorrected" output. It is plausible to believe that the
costs of such negotiations are not strongly related to the size of the
output produced or curtailed. At any rate, if we suppose this, the
costs of such negotiations being in the nature of overheads, the
attainment by negotiation of an optimal output requires that such
costs be less than the maximum total bribe (equal to the
hypothetical net benefit) that can be offered by either party. If
such negotiating costs do, however, exceed this maximal bribe, no
modification of the initial "uncorrected" output can take place.
The consequent maintenance of the status quo is then to be
justified on the grounds that the potential gains (the hypothetical
net benefit) from the change to optimum is less than the total
potential losses (the negotiating costs). Since these negotiating
costs are real enough, inasmuch as they involve scarce time and
other resources, the change in question would not be, over-all, a
true potential Pareto improvement, but would in fact involve a
residual real loss to the community.
By such reasoning, along with the perhaps inevitable reflection that
the fact of no approach having been made by the victims of spillover
to negotiate with the spillover-creating industry might be taken as
prima facie evidence that potential costs exceed potential gains,
economists found themselves perilously close to the ultra-conservative
conclusion that what is, is best. For the rest, one was to await the
advent of innovations, technical or institutional, which would reduce
the costs of preventive devices or the costs of negotiation and
administration.
These fairly widespread beliefs outlined above must now be
subjected to critical examination, which process requires that we first
clarify the economic concept of exact compensation.
THE CONCEPT OF EXACT COMPENSATION
The notion of a potential Pareto improvement, an economic
change such that everyone, via costless transfers, can be made better
off, is given precise expression by the algebraic summation of the
compensation variations (CV's) of all persons affected by the change
in question. If for example, person one benefits from the change to the
extent that he would pay a maximum of $50 to secure it, his CV is
measured as +$50. If at the same time some other individual, person
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two, loses from the change to the extent that a minimum of $40 has to
be paid to him to restore his welfare to its original level, his CV is
measured as - $40. If only these two people are affected by the
change, the algebraic sum of their CV's is (+ 50 - 40) or + 10, and the
change entails a potential Pareto improvement. For person one can
wholly compensate person two for his loss of $40, and yet himself
remain with a gain of $10, which net gain can of course be distributed
in any way. If now we suppose the reverse is true: if person one's CV
is only + $40 and person two's CV is - $50, the algebraic sum becomes
- $10, and the change entails a potential Pareto loss.
The CV is, therefore, defined most generally as a measure of the
money transfer, either to or from the individual, which, following
some economic change, maintains his welfare at the original level.
The rule that no economic change be allowed unless it realizes a
potential Pareto improvement, unless the algebraic sum of the CV's is
positive, is widely accepted among economists. Indeed, it is generally
believed that the operation of a good price system ensures that all
changes meet this condition. Suppose, however, that for one reason or
another, the price system is defective in the particular sense that an
economic change is brought into being which is not a potential Pareto
improvement, can we not discover this after the change and therefore
reverse the change?
To answer the question let us review the second example above in
which the economic change produces a CV of - $50 for person two
and a CV of + $40 for person one. The algebraic sum being - $10.
Clearly the change should not have been made. But if it has been
made, the economist reviewing the situation might expect to discover
that person two would now pay $50 to reverse the change and return
to the status quo ante. His expected CV for undoing the change would
be equal to + $50. Mutatis mutandi person one whose CV for the
change was + $40 might be expected to require no less than $40 in
order to forgo the change. Person one's CV for undoing the change
would be - $40. If the economist's expectations are correct, and this
sort of symmetry obtains, a return to the status quo ante produces an
algebraic summation of CV's of + $10 which entails a potential Pareto
improvement. In a partial analysis we might wish then to conclude
that the correct outcome is unambiguous: if a mistake does occur for
one reason or another, a careful review by the omniscient economist
will reveal the mistake and discover that the initial position was the
better one. In general, any optimal outcome we might wish to
conclude is unique, and any potential Pareto improvement (a
potential Pareto loss) is unambiguous.
This is true, however, only if the effects of the changes in question
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on people's welfare is negligible or if the difference made to the CV
by large changes in the level of welfare is negligible. Since the
disamenities we are concerned with are those having large effects on
people's welfare, we need only make the plausible assumption that
people's CV responses to these large welfare changes are "normal" to
destroy the desired symmetry of response, and therefore destroy the
uniqueness of Pareto optimal outcomes and unambiguity of Pareto
improvements.
If a person has "normal" or positive welfare effect for a good, a rise
in his welfare raises his demand for that good which, in turn, implies
that the maximum sum he will pay for any given amount of it, or,
alternatively, the minimum sum of money he will accept to forgo this
amount of it, will increase. This proposition has the further and
crucial implication that the maximum sum as CV he will pay for a
thing is generally less than the minimum sum as CV that will induce
him to part with it, at least this is true if he comes into possession of it
without having to pay the maximum sum for it (since in that case the
level of his welfare with possession is above that he enjoys without its
possession).
In the light of the above information let us return to the above
example which can be made more specific by identifying person one
as an inveterate cigarette smoker and person two as a non-smoker
allergic to cigarette smoke. The two persons have the misfortune of
having to share a one-roomed cabin for the night and the change
contemplated is (a) that of an agreement not to smoke if, initially, the
law permitted smoking, or (b) that of an agreement to smoke if,
initially, the law prohibited smoking in the absence of consent by all
in the cabin. Consider situation (a) first. The information about CV's is
summarized in the first row of Table I below:
State of Law
(a) Permissive
(b) Prohibitive

Smoker's
CV
-50
+45

Non-Smoker's
CV
+40
-50

Algebraic sum
of CV's
-10
- 5

Since the law permits smoking, it is up to the non-smoker to try to
bribe the smoker who is willing to refrain for a sum not less than 50.
Since he is to receive this sum as compensation for the change, his CV
is entered as - 50. But the maximum the smoker will pay to change
the smoke-permissive situation is 40, and his CV is accordingly + 40.
The algebraic sum of these two CV's is - 10, which is to say that the
non-smoker's offer falls short by $10 of the $50 demanded by the
smoker. It follows that the change should not be made. It is not
possible to make either as well or better off without making the other
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worse off. We conclude that the existing smoke-permissive arrangement is optimal.
Now suppose the Government changes the law to one of no
smoking in the absence of agreement of all parties. Initially the
smoker's welfare is increased, that of the non-smoker decreased, and
their respective CV's are revised accordingly. The non-smoker will
not be persuaded to give up his new right to clean air for less than
$50, hence - 50 for his CV is entered in the (b) row. The smoker, who
is worse off inasmuch as he has lost his right to smoke, will offer to pay
only $45. The algebraic sum of the two CV's is now - 5, and we are
impelled to conclude that the existing non-smoking situation is
optimal.
The apparent triviality of the example and the deliberate exclusion
of any alternative arrangements 4 or compromises 5 do not detract from
its allocated significance, namely, that what is optimal depends upon
the law. If in a market economy the law placed no checks on spillover
effects, it may be possible to show that the losses suffered by the
victims as judged by the maximum sums they are willing to pay to
remove some given quantum of spillover, their CV's under the
spillover permissive law, is smaller than the gains to the manufacturer
as judged by the minimum sums they are willing to accept. But, as
indicated in the preceding example, a change to a spilloverprohibiting law benefits the erstwhile victims and causes their CV's
(as minimal sums they are willing to accept) to be revised upward,
may reveal that manufacturers of that amount of goods, along with
their spillover effects to be uneconomical. The relevance of this thesis
grows with the range and magnitude of adverse spillover effects
produced by economic activity.
There is another feature of this concept that calls for greater care
than has hitherto been exercised in this interpretation. The CV is a
partial concept. It measures the worth of a single change or
combination of changes in a person's welfare in terms of money or
commodities. The CV is then properly regarded as a function of the
availability and/or the prices of the substitutes for the good in
question. The maximum a man will pay for a license to buy as much
as he wants of, for example, electricity at a given price becomes
larger the higher the prices of other things, in particular those of gas
4. Such as the conditions under which separate facilities for groups with opposing tastes are
preferable to an optimal arrangement within a single precinct or area. This separate areas
argument is developed in my Costs of Economic Growth, (1967).
5. By breaking up the total length of time into smaller and smaller intervals we can, under
familiar assumptions, determine an optimal "output" interval of smoking, but again under a
smoke-permissive law this optimal time interval will be larger than that under a law that
required unanimity before smoking were permitted.
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or oil. Similarly, the maximum sum a man will pay for a motor car
will increase as public transportation becomes less efficient. His CV
appears largest if all alternative modes of travel have disappeared. It
becomes possible, therefore, for an increase in a motorist's CV or
"consumer's surplus" to be associated with a reduction in his welfare
as other forms of travel, say public transport, become less efficient or
become unavailable. If quietness, specifically the absence of engine
noise, is disappearing over the whole country, the maximum a person
will pay to move to a location free of noise-infestation (as also the
minimum he will accept to give up the location) will therefore grow.
Per contra, as there are ready substitutes in the shape of accessible
villages and small towns free of noise, his consumer's surplus appears
smaller. Similarly for the case of aircraft noise, the magnitude of the
spillover, as measured by compensatory payments, appears smaller if
there are available to the victim of aircraft noise assured havens of
quiet.
This transparent, though often neglected consideration, makes one
sceptical of the value of any scheme that would calculate the social
costs of disamenities by reference to differences in property values.
Assume for the present that people's response to aircraft noise is
uniformly sensitive. The difference in property values, say house
values, normalizing for type of house and for site advantages (other
than quiet) within zones, will depend on their accessibility to quiet
areas. For example, we can suppose there was a time when all aircraft
noise was evenly spread and localized within a circle (or ellipse6 ) of
one mile across. Houses that had already been built within the circle
depreciate in value once the airport is established. The difference in
the value of houses within and outside the circle could then be taken
as an exact measure of the CV,7 the minimum sum the exposed family
will require to maintain its welfare at the level enjoyed before the
construction of the airport.
If, with the passage of time and the build-up of the airport, noise
increases and spreads out in concentric circles of diminishing intensity
then, assuming that, noise apart, people are indifferent to location,
differences in the market values of houses can still be used as an exact
measure of required compensation. But if now aircraft noise extends
so that no house in the region is free of it, then the houses that are
least exposed will command the highest market value even though the
6. The actual shape depends on a variety of factors which, though they complicate the
calculation, make no difference to the argument in the text.
7. The removal of the assumption of identical tastes does not alter the broad conclusions,
although the quantitative estimates will obviously depend upon the differences in reaction to
noise. If practical considerations require a system of uniform compensation, some families may
receive too much and some too little.
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noise is appreciable, whereas, when there had been a completely
quiet zone, such houses were valued at but a fraction of the highest
market value. Once quiet zones disappear and noise spreads, the
differences in market values become smaller notwithstanding the
decline in general welfare.
Thus the volume of noise in each of the bands separated by
concentric circles could double without any alteration of the differences in market value. Furthermore, as the volume of noise moves out
uniformly, the differences in market value can tend to zero.
Under such developments differences in market value cannot be
used as a basis for estimating the cost of aircraft noise to society. The
true social cost can only be calculated by reference to the hypothetical noise-free situation. An exact measure of the social cost of aircraft
noise is the sum of the CV's, 8 an aggregate of the minimal sums
acceptable to all persons affected, to persuade each of them to bear
with the noise experienced when the alternative offered is no noise at
all.
If these costs of aircraft noise, so calculated, cannot be covered by
the maximum net revenues of the relevant airlines9 after aircraft have
been fitted, where possible, with anti-noise devices, the continued
operation of the airlines is untenable on the Pareto criterion. The
search to meet the Pareto criterion without abandoning the air
services would involve experiments in curtailing the noisier planes
and re-routing others over less densely populated areas in the
endeavor to reduce social costs to the level at which they could be
covered by the revenues.
There are obviously practical difficulties in attempting to estimate
this exact measure of noise-infestation, even if the authorities are
prepared to engage in sample surveys. But we shall not discuss them
here. 10
TRANSACTION COSTS
The preceding sections served to illustrate how an alteration in the
law, from being permissive of noxious spillover effects to being
8. To be pedantic, one should say the algebraic sum of the CVs to include any persons whose
welfare is enhanced by the noise.
9. This maximum annual net revenue may be taken roughly as the area between the demand
curves and the long run marginal cost curves of the airline corporations less annual costs of the
air terminal they incur.
10. If one can convince the person interviewed (a) that if people are ready to pay enough
something definitely will be done about aircraft noise, and (b) that whatever the formula
reached it will be applied impartially on a per capita or income basis, one could hope for useful
estimates of the maximum sum people are ready to pay. Such sums must be regarded,
nonetheless, as being underestimates (i) because it is reasonable to expect that something more
than these declared maximum sums could be squeezed out of any person, and (ii) because even if
they were accurate, such maximum sums are smaller than the minimal amounts they would be
prepared to receive. And it is the latter sum that is the compensating variation we are after.
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prohibitive of them, acts to redistribute welfare among the opposing
groups thereby altering the values of their respective CV's and
making possible a reversal of the conclusion about optimality. In
particular, if the law is tolerant of spillover, the establishment of a
spillover-creating project, say a highway or airport, can be shown to
be a Pareto improvement whereas if the law discountenanced
spillovers. Then the establishment of such a project emerges as a
Pareto loss. 11
So far the costs of bringing about economic changes have been
deliberately ignored. Once we take cognizance of negotiating,
administrative and other costs that are unavoidably incurred in
effecting economic changes such as correcting a situation or an output
for spillover effects, the position of the law with respect to spillovers
becomes of critical importance.
Beginning from a situation under the existing law, we have seen
that an economic change can be regarded as a Pareto improvement if
the algebraic sum of the CV's of all affected parties is positive. If it is
positive, its magnitude will be identified as the net benefit (NB) of the
change in question. Being the sum by which the gains of one group
exceed the losses of the other group, it represents a net dividend
which, assuming costless transfer payments, can be shared among the
members of the community in any way which would make all of them
better off.
Obviously, the NB depends upon the particular Pareto improvement reached which in turn depends upon the law and, to some
extent, the bargaining between parties. Although the NB is positive in
moving from an original position toward a Pareto improvement, a
positive NB is not a sufficient condition for recommending such a
movement. Since real costs are involved in negotiating and maintaining the improved position, it is worthwhile incurring them only if
they amount to a sum smaller than the NB. The criterion which
warrants a movement to a new position is, therefore, that the residual
benefit (RB) be positive, where RB is defined as NB - G.
Transactions costs (G) will vary inter alia with the number of firms
and people involved, with the type of spillover, with the method of
moving to a new position, in particular whether the government is to
regulate output through a tax-subsidy scheme or whether it is reached
through mutual agreement. What is of more concern here, however, is
that transactions costs can vary with the law. And even where they do
11. We also mentioned in passing that if the project in question was not an all-or-nothing
offer but one providing a variable output, the existence of a pollution-permissive law would lead
the economist to conclude that the optimal output was smaller than it would be under a
pollution-prohibiting law.
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not vary with the law, they can be large enough to wipe out the net
benefits of a Pareto improvement. Their magnitude in such cases is
then such as to allow for only polar solutions. Whichever law is in
force, the existing situation appears optimal in the sense that the
transactions costs exceed the Pareto gains; i.e., NB is positive, but RB,
equal to (G - NB), is negative.
Although for heuristic reasons I shall concentrate on the negotiated
solution, it should be pointed out that the difficulties pertaining to a
governmentally imposed solution via taxes or subsidies has been
exaggerated for two reasons: (1) Because of a propensity to deal with
the problem in connection with two firms or industries, each of which
is assumed to suffer from the spillovers of the other, and (2) because it
is taken for granted that continual changes in the conditions of
demand and supply over time will require continual revisions of the
optimal tax or subsidy.
With respect to (1), however, once the focus of concern shifts from
the firm to the public, these reciprocal effects do not arise. The
relevant spillover effects move in one direction only: from industry or
its products to the public in general, or to the inhabitants of a locality.
As for the second difficulty (2), much depends upon whether the
government wishes to use taxes or subsidies rather than direct controls
on output and upon the degree of refinement anticipated in calculating optimal outputs.
There is something of a law of diminishing returns connected with
the latter option which renders it uneconomic to aim for refinement
beyond a certain degree. In the case of significant public disamenities,
initial reductions of the economic activity promise the greatest
benefit. As we reduce the activity further the benefits become smaller
and the costs of greater accuracy become larger. One can reasonably
expect substantial net benefits by reducing spillover-output up to a
point that may be, for example, 20 per cent or even more on either
side of the optimal output. Rough comprehensive calculations will
serve to capture the greater part of the potential improvement, and
just because there is a margin of error, they will not warrant frequent
revision.
Since one of the pet propositions of laissez-faire exponents is that, if
there is a mutual gain in moving to an optimal output from any initial
position, or in having preventive devices installed, there is always an
incentive for the parties to arrange to do so. Therefore, government
intervention is unnecessary. We shall concentrate mainly on the costs
of reaching mutual agreement. For if such costs of negotiation exceed
the potential gains (if NB is negative), laissez-faire exponents will
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further argue that there is no economic justification for a change from
the existing output position.
These transaction costs (G) can be broken down into sub-categories.
Let G1 stand for the costs of negotiating agreement between the
parties having conflicting interests over adverse spillover effects. Let
G 2 stand for the costs of administration and supervision that are
necessary to maintain the mutually agreed solution. And let G3 stand
for the capital outlays, if any, required to implement the agreement
in question.
The G 1 costs would appear to be the more significant of the three,
and those more likely to vary with the law on legal liability, at least
for the case of environmental spillovers suffered by the public at
large. Under the existing pollutant-permissive or L law these costs
would include for the public, (a) the costs associated with taking the
initiative, plus the costs (b) of identifying the victims of the spillover
effects in question; (c) of communicating with each of them; (d) of
persuading enough of them to agree to the idea of making a joint offer
to the spillover-generating industry; (e) of reaching agreement among
themselves on the sums to be offered to that industry; and also on the
contribution toward these sums to be made by each of them, and (f)
the costs of negotiation with the industry.
Once the representatives of the public approach the industry, a
favorable response will involve it in a parallel breakdown of expenses.
Thus, there will be the costs (b') of identifying the firms responsible;
(c') of communicating with each of them; (d') of persuading the firms
to consider accepting an offer from the public; (e') of reaching
agreement between the firms concerned about the sums acceptable
for their cooperation, and also about the formula on which any agreed
sum is to be shared among them; and (f') of negotiation with the
representatives of the public.
It would seem that such costs are much higher for the public than
they are for the industry. For instance, the costs (b), (c), (d) and (e) for
the public will increase rapidly with the numbers of spillover victims
and with their dispersion over the affected area, whereas, for the
industry the costs (b'), (c'), (d') and (e') will not increase so rapidly
with numbers. For the numbers involved are small (it may be only a
single firm), and they tend to be concentrated within an area rather
than dispersed over it. Moreover, reaching decisions on behalf of their
stockholders is a routine matter for business executives.
This difference in the G1 costs as between the public on the one
hand, and the spillover-generating industry on the other is, however,
of incidental interest. The relevant question is whether, taken
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together, they are likely to be any less under a pollutant repressive or
I law than the are under the existing L law.
Under the L law, the initiative has to be taken by the spillovergenerating industry, and the sequence is reversed. The breakdown of
the costs incurred by the industry in preparation for an approach to
the public is in the order (b'), (c'), (d') and (e'), and they now have
reference to the industry's making an offer, rather than to its
accepting one. Once it is approached by the industry, the public has
to incur costs (b), (c), (d) and (e), before being ready to negotiate. This
breakdown of costs now having reference to the acceptance of offers
made to them.
Ignoring for the moment the costs of initiative (a), it is hard to give
convincing reasons for expecting that any of these items should be
markedly different under one form of law as compared with the other,
an exception being item (d). The cost of persuading a large enough
number of spillover victims to accept the idea of making a joint offer
to the industry under the L law is sure to be much heavier than that of
persuading them under the L law to accept the idea of receiving a
joint offer from the industry. In contrast, for (d') the cost of persuading
each firm under the L law to accept the idea of making a joint offer to
the public is virtually nil, and it is likely to be the same for persuading
them under L law to accept the idea of receiving a joint offer from
the spillover victims. For the firms' financial interests are foremost in
the minds of their business executives, and virtually no persuasion is
required to ensure receptivity to a scheme, under either law, which
may add to their profits. If this argument is valid, the G 1 costs will be
heavier to some extent under the existing L law than they would be
under an L law.
The question of initiative in (a) has been left to the last because of
its crucial importance. If initiative were a good having a supply price,
or at least a determinable cost, there could be no argument for
intervention so long as the existing law were accepted as a datum.
And the fact that a potential Pareto improvement has not been
negotiated might be regarded as prima facie evidence that RB was
negative. Since this notion of a supply price for initiative is untenable,
any inference that known methods of correcting existing polluting
economic acitivities must have a negative RB, is in this circumstance
unwarranted.
To conclude, from an observation that no agreement has been
negotiated, that no agreement can be negotiated is a non sequitur. If
such an invalid argument is accepted there will be an obvious
reluctance to admit intervention in the market outcome. One then
justifies the absence of mutual arrangements in such cases on the
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grounds that the RB must be negative, and the presence of mutual
arrangements on the grounds that the RB must be positive. The
import of this way of thinking is to rationalize the status quo, and to
encourage complacency rather than to draw attention to methods
whereby initiative might be made available at a cost by institutional
changes. If, for example, a government agency were set up empowered to investigate instances of widespread disamenity arising out
of the activities of industry or its products, it might well be able to
cover the cost of its maintenance in negotiating optimizing agreements on behalf of the public, whereas in2 the absence of this agency
such agreements might never take place.'
Under an TL law, in contrast, the necessary initiative could be
expected to appear. Even if there were resource costs of initiative
that could be identified they would not be likely to add much to the
costs of routine decision making by a firm. The risks are smaller since
under an 1 law the firm can be assumed not to venture into a market
without first having reasonably reliable information on the extent of
the damages it would inflict on the public. Indeed, a firm under an L
law is unlikely to invest in plant and machinery for the manufacture
of certain goods unless it has reason to expect that, after all economic
preventive devices have been installed, it can afford to pay compensation for the residual damages.
Although, in view of the above considerations, it may be thought
improper to talk of the resource costs of initiative, in order to remind
ourselves of the decisive importance of the asymmetry revealed under
the two types of law, we could include it with the other G 1 costs by
attributing to it a hypothetical figure. That figure would be the
minimum sum that would induce someone to take the initiative and
to bear the risks of failure such initiative entails. We can then
continue to associate the larger G I costs with a movement toward
optimality under the L law as compared with the L law.
The neglect of this association of greater difficulty, or larger
transactions costs, in reaching optimality under an L law than under
an 1 law would appear to be another of the consequences of the
common addiction of confining examples of spillover to those between
12. Allowing that the idea of making an approach to the industry in question occurs to a
private individual, or to a number of them, the risk of failure at any of the stages (b) to (f) grows
with the numbers of the victims and their dispersion. Apart from the sense of civic satisfaction
and the change of gain from publicity, the benefit to the initiating party is no more than the
difference between the maximum he (or they) would pay to reduce the spillover and what he (or
they) actually pay(s) including his share of all costs in trying to reach agreement. This limited
benefit has to be set against the risk of irrecoverable loss of expenses and the certain loss of time
and effort until such time as he succeeds, if he does, in setting up a representative organization
to reimburse his expenses, after which the organization itself and the wider membership have to
risk losing their money.
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firms or industries. For such cases, the tacit belief that the magnitude
of G would not be much affected by a change in the law may be
justified. Such a belief would not be justified, however, in those
instances where the spillover generated by private industry falls on
the public at large. For such instances, there are reasons for believing
that the magnitude of G is larger under the L law than under anL
law. The significance of this proposition, along with the recognition of
the practical importance of the magnitude of G under any sort of law,
may now be indicated for the three cases that exhaust the possibilities.
First, the case under which either kind of law, L or 1, the RB is
positive. In such instances a Pareto optimal arrangement emerges
under either law. If output is variable, we may infer that (assuming
"normal" welfare effects) the optimal output will be smaller under
the E3 law.
However, the relative size of the RB is significant only if we start
from the same non-optimal output in the two cases. Here, we reach
an optimal position by starting from different bases: from a larger
than optimal output under the L law, and from a zero output under
the 1 law. If we are indifferent as between the L law and 1 law
optimal positions, the only remaining considerations are the transaction costs which are likely to be heavier under the L law than under
the 1 law. For such cases, therefore, there is a presumption in favor of
law.
The second case is that for which the RB is negative under one type
of law and positive under the other. Thus, it is possible that under
existing L law, the RB is negative while under the I law the RB is
positive. The reverse, however, is no less possible, even though
transactions costs are assumed to be lower under I3 law. In the
absence of empirical knowledge nothing can be said in favor of either
law for this second case.
The third case is that for which under either kind of law the RB of
a movement to a potential optimum output is negative. Accepting the
L law as it is, one can do little more than wait for those innovations in
technology or administration which allow of a reduction in the costs
of preventive devices or in negotiation costs, etc. If, however, we have
a choice between adopting L law or I law, we have in effect the
choice between "too much" of the spillover or "too little" respectively. But allocative considerations apply here also. Since the magnitude
of the G costs prohibits an optimal output under either law, we have
now to compare the two polar solutions realized under the alternative
states of the law. These solutions are the unconstrained market output
of the spillover-generating product under the L law and a zero output
under the L law.
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If the NB of moving from an unconstrained market output to a zero
output was positive (using familiar economic geometry if, for the
demand and supply curves appropriate to each law, the triangle to
the right of the optimum point were larger than that to the left), the L
law is better. If, however, the reverse is the case, the L law is the
better.
In the absence of information on the costs placed by people on
spillovers there can be no firm reason to suppose that, at any moment
of time, one type of law is superior to the other for this third case.
However, there is one general consideration which tends to favor the
view that, over time, the changeover to L law would result
increasingly in potential Pareto gains. Output per capita in the West
is rising over time. Included are goods whose use and/or production
generate noxious spillovers. Apart from changes in technique which,
under the existing L law, may raise or lower spillovers, we could say
that spillovers are increasing in at least the same proportion as GNP,
but probably in greater proportion, since the "growth industries,"
automobiles, plane travel, chemical products, tourism, nuclear power,
motorized lawn-motors, diesel saws, pneumatic drills, motor boats,
etc., are all prolific generators of spillovers. The additional goods per
capita produced by the economy taken as a whole are subject to
diminishing marginal utility. Although an x% increase of both goods
and spillovers cannot be expected at all times to make a person worse
off than he was before, the point will come when, if he has the choice
of either the consumption of the good (along with the spillover
generated by everyone's consumption of it) or going without both the
good and the spillover, he will opt for the latter.
We may conclude then that there is, on balance, a presumption in
favor of L law on allocative grounds alone.
The presumption in favor of I law gains strength in passing from a
partial analysis to a more general one in which the repercussions of
"incorrect pricing" owing to the L law is felt throughout the
economy. To illustrate, suppose Pigou's smoky factory initially
produces an output that can be optimally corrected under either law,
though in fact the L law is in operation. One element in the costs of
spillover is the cost to the victims of additional soap. If soap is now
produced by an industry that disposes of its waste products in an
adjacent stream, the output and price of the soap may remain
uncorrected under the L law because of the magnitude of the G costs.
However, as in our second case above, we may assume that output
and price can be corrected under an L law. Under an L law there will
be a positive RB in reducing soap output to an optimal amount with
its price raised to equal its social marginal cost. As a result of the
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higher price of soap under the L law, the optimal output of the smoky
factory will be smaller than what it is under an L law.
Nor need we stop there, for there may be intermediate products
which enter into the production of goods manufactured by the smoky
factory, into the production of soap, or into the production of any
goods in the economy, that compared with the optimal situation
under L law are under-priced. If so, the outputs of such goods remain
larger than their potential optimal outputs under an L law, whether
or not they generate spillovers themselves. In so far as any number of
intermediate products are under-priced under an L law compared
with an L law, not only are the outputs of such products themselves
too large, so also are the outputs of all the other goods into which they
enter as intermediate products. So also are the outputs of goods which
use these former goods as intermediate products, and so on. Thus an
"ideal" allocation under the L law (in the RB sense) is consistent with
widespread mis-allocation of resources by the lights of an L law. 13
To sum up, the state of the law affects the optimal position in two
ways. In the preceding section we demonstrated that, ignoring all
transactions costs, the optimal output of goods having adverse
spillover effects differs according to the law. Positing normal welfare
effects the optimal output of those goods generating adverse spillovers
will be greater with the L law than with the L law, regardless of the
bargaining between the parties. In the present section we have
argued also that the magnitude of the transaction costs can vary with
the law and can be such that an optimal output having a positive RB
may be reached under either type of law, under neither type of law,
or may be reached under an L law but not under an L law. We
concluded that there is a presumption of greater social gain under the
" law, and that an ideal allocation in the RB sense under the L law is
consistent with a widespread potential mis-allocation under the I
law.
These conclusions matter even if a governmentally imposed
optimal solution or the installation of preventive devices is being
contemplated. A cost benefit analysis showing that a particular
project yields a positive algebraic sum of CV's under the L law might
also reveal a negative algebraic sum under the T law. Again, although
optimal outputs may be economically feasible under either type of
law, there is still the question of which optimal output to aim at, the
one under an L law, or the smaller one under an L law. There is still a
13. Beneficial spillovers, which do not entail mutual conflict, remain unaffected by a change
from L to L law. Nevertheless our conclusions in the text would need further qualification
where the industries involved produced both damaging and beneficial spillovers and the latter
were not fully "exploited".
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decision to be made, and we must consider it further on other than
purely allocative grounds.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW
Having established the proposition that the state of the law is a
factor in the determination of the optimal output and in the feasibility
of its attainment, the question naturally arises, what state of the law,
if either, should the economist favor? For although the issue of which
law, L or L, is not within the immediate control of the economist
engaged in some cost-benefit study, his choice of which law ought to
apply will determine his estimate of the compensatory payments that
must be compared with the "profits" of the enterprise, or alternatively with the cost of preventive devices or other methods of reducing
the disamenity. In cases where the impact on people's welfare is
substantial, as with aircraft noise, the difference between the
maximum sum a man is willing to pay in order to rid himself of some
economic "bad" and the minimum amount he is prepared to accept
to put up with it can also be substantial. 14
A. Research into Preventive Devices
On allocative grounds we have argued that there is a general
presumption in favor of L law, law that is prohibitive of spillover
unless there is mutual agreement to the contrary. 15 There is, however,
a more dynamic allocative argument favoring L law. Once the burden
of full compensation for spillovers enters into the cost of production
or use of a good on a legal par with all other costs incurred in
compensating members of the community for disutilities borne, the
manufacturer will be immediately concerned with seeking out
opportunities of reducing these spillover-compensation costs, as well
as reducing his resource costs. For if he does come up with preventive
devices that are lower in cost than the compensatory payments they
displace, he effects a real saving in the economy at large. A given
output is produced at smaller real (social) cost. Under the L law, in
contrast, there is little incentive to switch part of his resources from
current research into ways of raising quality or reducing product
costs, to research into ways of curbing the spillovers that are
incidentally produced. Thus the existence of the L law imparts a bias
to the allocation of his funds for research and development against
14. An extreme example brings this out. A man dying of thirst in the middle of the Sahara
could offer for a bottle of water that would save his life, no more than his existing assets plus his
prospective earnings (above some efficient subsistence level). But this sum would be infinitesimal
compared with the sum of money needed to induce him to forego the bottle of water and fatally
reduce his chance of survival.
15. This qualification may be removed in particular examples, as we shall see later.
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research into spillover-reducing innovations, which implies that, over
time opportunities for substantial social gains would go ignored under
the L law. In other words, accepting the formal assumption that the
entrepreneur allocates his research funds among alternatives according to an equimarginal principle, he will under the L law ignore all
the opportunities for social gains which could be made by directing
research funds into the improving of preventive devices. So long as he
is not accountable for spillovers, any allocation of funds into research
to discover better methods of curbing them serves only to reduce his
profits.
B. Separate Facilities
In those cases where it remains costly under existing technological
conditions to reduce spillover effects by taxes on goods or by
preventive devices, the establishment of L law, which puts the burden
of compensation on the producers of spillovers, provides greater
incentive to promote a separate-areas solution. If there were no
feasible economic alternative under L law other than compensating
the victims of aircraft noise, privately owned air lines would seek to
re-route their flights away from well-populated areas. In addition,
they may be able to reduce compensatory payments to some or all of
the remaining victims by offering to offset their costs of movement to
the quieter zones by their re-routing of flights.
If the sales of private planes for business and amusement continue
to expand, as they are sure to do under the existing legislation, a
change to L law would provide a greater incentive to industry to
promote the purchase of large areas within which private flying, at
least for amusement, would be confined. For business purposes it
would obviously be uneconomic for private planes to fly outside the
scheduled routes negotiated by the air companies.
Moreover, this notion of a separate areas solution as a superior
alternative to an optimal solution that is effected within a single
larger area is not irrelevant to a cost-benefit study examining a large
variety of alternatives. If the technical possibilities of reducing
aircraft noise are small, there may appear to be no economic case
under an I law for permitting a limited number of flights, or even for
the establishment of an airport, other than in some remote part of the
country. For given the distribution of the existing population, the
compensatory payments required from the airline companies to offset
the welfare losses of the population affected may be prohibitive. In
such circumstances, an economic case might be made for more of
such flights, or for a less remote airport, only if the government were
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disposed first to set aside reasonably large and viable areas to be
designated as noise-free areas and to offset the costs of movement into
them.
The separate-areas concept has much wider applications. Prior to a
change in the law, any government at all concerned with the welfare
of its citizens can take the initiative in a number of fairly radical but
realistic experiments. It can, for instance, make a start by promoting a
scheme for a number of large residential areas through which no
motorized traffic would be permitted to pass and over which no
aircraft would be permitted to fly. It may be true, although not likely,
that only a minority would care to live in such amenity areas. But the
market under existing legislation will never present it with the choice,
if only because legislation would be required to prevent aircraft flying
within hearing distance of such areas and to prevent motorized traffic
from entering them. Municipalities in their turn could do much to
improve the pleasantness of the environment simply by keeping
motor traffic away from some large shopping centers, narrow roads,
cathedral precincts and other places of beauty or historic interest that
can be enjoyed only in a traffic-free setting.
C. Distributionof Welfare
There may also be a case for 1 law in terms of the distribution of
welfare, if it can be shown that the goods which generate spillovers
largely earn incomes for, and are purchased by, groups that have
higher incomes on the average than the rest of the community. Even
in the absence of evidence for this not implausible hypothesis, it is
undeniable that the rich have less need of protection from the
disamenity created by others. The richer a man is the wider is his
choice of residence. If the locality he happens to choose appears to be
sinking in the scale of amenity, he can move to a quieter area. He can
select a suitable town house, secluded perhaps or made soundproof
throughout, and spend his leisure in the country or abroad at times of
his own choosing. Per contra, the poorer the family, the less
opportunity it has for moving from its present locality. To all intents
it is stuck in the area and must put up with whatever disamenity is
inflicted upon it. And, based on observations during the last decade or
two, it is obvious that it will be the neighborhoods of the working and
lower middle classes that will suffer most from the increased
construction of fly-overs and fly-unders and road-widening schemes
designed to speed up the accumulating road traffic. The establishment
of 13 law would not only promote a rise in the standards of
environment generally, it would raise them most for the lower income
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groups which have suffered more than the rest of the population from
the unchecked "development" and the growth of motorized traffic
since World War II.
D. Equity
More important than the distributional implications is the inequity
of law that countenances the inflicting of a wide range of damages on
others without ready and effective means of redress. In the absence of
comprehensive sanctions against trespass on the citizen's environment, existing institutions lend themselves inadvertently to a process
of blackmail, insofar as they place the burden of reaching agreement
on the person or group whose interests have been damaged. Although
the disabilities inflicted on innocent parties may be judged with less
severity when they are generated as a by-product of the pursuit of
gain under existing laws than when they are produced for the sole
purpose of exacting payment, a Pareto improvement is met in either
case by a "voluntary" agreement to pay by the party whose rights,
liberties or interests, are under threat. Indeed, the virtue of the Pareto
principle resides in its alleged neutrality. If person A amuses himself
by throwing smoke bombs through B's window but agrees to desist on
payment of $10 a week, both are made better off if person B chooses
to pay it rather than to continue to suffer these depredations. And
though all existing law is directed to preventing calculated blackmail
and victimization, there is still this hiatus in the law that enables
incidental damage, albeit increasingly severe and lasting damage, to
be inflicted on people unless they discover a means effectively of
bribing the perpetrators to desist.
It is all the more imperative, then, to perceive a distinction within
the notion of ethical neutrality. It is conceived on the one hand as a
disregard of ethical implication (which is the sense in which the
Pareto principle is neutral), and on the other hand as impartiality
between the alternative ways of giving effect to the principle (which
is, though mistakenly, the sense usually attributed to it). Thus,
whether A successfully compensates B, or whether instead B successfully compensates A, a Pareto improvement is effected. Such
interaction is all too frequently believed illustrative of the cardinal
virtue of an economic principle that is thought to be above and
independent of the law. If the non-smoker's enjoyment is reduced by
the smoker's freedom to smoke, so also, it is argued, is the smoker's
enjoyment reduced by abstaining for the better comfort of the
non-smoker. The freedom 6f each to pursue his enjoyment necessarily
interferes with the enjoyment of the other. It is concluded, therefore,
that the conflict of interest is symmetric in all relevant respects, and
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the determination of which of the parties ought, if possible, to
compensate the other is held either to be of no concern to economics
or else something to be settled by reference to the distributional
implications.
But a situation may be Pareto symmetrical without being ethically
symmetrical. In other words, with respect to the mutuality of conflict
it is symmetrical, but it is not symmetrical with respect to the equity.
In accordance with the liberal maxim, the freedom of any man to
smoke what he chooses, when he chooses, and where he chooses,
would indeed be conceded, but with the critical proviso that his
smoking take place in circumstances which do not reduce the
freedom or welfare of others. In so far as it does reduce the freedom or
welfare of others, the freedom of the smoker to smoke is not
symmetrical with the freedom desired by the non-smoker, since the
freedom of the latter does not go beyond the breathing of fresh air.
Unlike the freedom of the smoker, it does not reduce the amenity
enjoyed by others. Similarly, the benefits enjoyed by any person as a
result of operating noisy vehicles, lawn-mowers, or airplanes do
incidentally damage the welfare of those who wish to live quietly. In
contrast, living quietly does not of itself inflict any damage on the
operators of noisy vehicles. Thus a conflict of interest does not imply
equal culpability, at least not when it arises, as it always does in the
case of spillovers onto the public, from the damages inflicted by only
one of the parties on the other. Unless the law is altered so as to
provide comprehensive safeguards for the citizens (which is implied
by the establishment of L law), any voluntary agreements that might
be concluded within the existing L legal framework cannot be
vindicated, at least not on ethical grounds, by invoking simple
allocative arguments.
Where the welfare effects involved are substantial, it is even more
difficult to vindicate on grounds of equity the workings of the market
or the implementation of cost-benefit studies. The outcome of such
institutions or techniques does not entail voluntary agreements among
all persons affected. At this point, it is important to stress the turn in
the argument away from allocation toward equity.
In the preceding sections we have confined ourselves primarily to
allocative considerations. We have shown how projects admitted as
economically feasible under L law could be rejected by TI law, and
vice versa, as a result of both differences in welfare effects and
differences in transaction costs. Also we have indicated arguments
which lead to a presumption in favor of I law. But the principles of
resource allocation realized by universal perfect competition in the
absence of spillovers and by unambiguous cost-benefit calculations
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amount only to the criterion that the algebraic sum of all compensatory variations pertinent to an economic change be positive. Only a
potential Pareto improvement, or hypothetical compensation test, is
met in moving from a sub-optimal to an optimal position, in moving
from one non-optimal position to a "better" non-optimal position, or
in meeting an acceptable investment criterion. Such allocative rules,
or project criteria, are acceptable only so long as their fulfillment does
not alter the pattern of welfare in a regressive or unjust way. In the
absence of spillover effects, a perfectly competitive price system
would meet this condition, if resource costs were constant for changes
in the conditions of demand and supply. Project criteria would also
meet this condition provided the tax system was egalitarian. But in
the presence of spillover effects having a substantial impact on
people's welfare, the condition is not met regardless of horizontal cost
curves or of egalitarian tax systems. Feasible cost benefit studies
which take full account of spillover effects would admit as unambiguously feasible projects which inflict on some groups large losses of
welfare without compensation. Those adversely affected could in fact
be a majority. They could be among the poorer income groups. They
could simply be the hypersensitive persons in the community. But
whatever their composition, there is little consolation for them in the
economists' assurance that others are profiting from the project to
such an extent that they, the victims, could fully be compensated,
although, in fact, they will not be compensated.
Now many new investment projects are of this nature, especially
those involving air and ground transport. The welfare effects are
large, often regressive, and certainly inequitable. I see no reason why
ecomists should feel bound in such circumstances to attach more
importance to allocation than to equity. It is about time we
recognized our strong professional bias in favor of allocative merit
which arises mainly from the historical development of the subject,
and from the intellectual interests vested in elegant mathematical
notation. An era that is witnessing, in the world's most economically
advanced country, the weird spectacle of apparently unlimited
(man-made) goods pressing relentlessly against limited needs is as
good a time as any to promote the primacy of equity as an essential
ingredient of the good life. The guiding maxim I would offer is that it
is more important to prevent avoidable suffering than to create
further opportunities for self-indulgence. For this reason I favor the
enactment of a charter of amenity rights of the citizen, inspired by
the slogan "No pollution without compensation." Once such constitutional changes in the law are enacted and no man can be deprived of
his elementary rights to peace and quiet and clean air without his
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explicit consent, then and only then should we be reconciled to the
voice of prudence that bids us move cautiously and talks of the prior
need for extensive research. 16
E. Incomplete Information
A change from L to L law transfers the weight of inertia from one
side of the economic calculus to the other; from being a force acting
to maintain current spillovers to one acting to repress them. If, for a
number of significant spillovers, the costs of negotiating and regulating appears to be so great under either law that the RB is negative
(the third case in the preceding section) the effective choice boils
down to having the market output of the good along with the
accompanying spillover under the existing L law, or going without
the good and without the spillover under the I law. Because in
practice we have to face such all-or-nothing choices, it is worth
considering whether the fact that in economic life we have to take
decisions without complete information adds further to the
presumption in favor of L law.
The increasing pace of technological advance results in a growing
time-lag between the appreciation of the immediate and commercially applicable consequences of any innovation and the awareness of
additional consequences which come to the public notice only
gradually. Some of these latter consequences may far exceed in social
damage the initial benefit reaped from commercial exploitation. We
are only beginning to consider the cumulative effects on man's health
and his chances of survival of the continued use of chemical pesticides
and of a large number of pain-killing drugs, of the growing pollution
of the atmosphere and of lakes, rivers, and seas with sewage and oils
and of radiation hazards from the atomic wastes of peaceful nuclear
energy-generation. Even with so common a spillover as noise the
effect on people's physical and emotional health is thought to be more
serious than the mere nuisance effect usually attributed to it. It is one
thing for the medical practitioner to identify and classify an
increasing number of bronchial, cancerous, coronary, nervous and
psychic disorders. It is another to discover clear quantitative relationships between specific disorders and specific spillovers, even though
there is little doubt that spillovers broadly defined do create or
aggravate many such disorders. Insofar as the group concerned
underestimates the effects on itself of a number of spillovers, the
negotiated solution, even where practicable, is not satisfactory. But if,
16. However, no citizen need incur any expense by bringing charges against a private
concern since it will be an offense against the state to produce any of a specified range of
spillovers without an official permit (issued say annually).
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because of this tendency to underestimate the damage inflicted by
current spillovers, economists are able to infer that the resulting
outputs under I law would still be too large, they cannot, in the
absence of quantitative evidence, specify exactly the size of an ideal
output. All they may say is that the ideal outputs should be smaller
than those being realized, and that in view of the ultimate consequences the ideal outputs of some goods may in fact be zero.
F. Spillover Effects on Posterity
Another consideration reinforces the belief that spillover effects
tend to be underestimated. Many of the important spillover effects
are irreversible. The destruction of the scenic beauty, the poisoning of
rivers, streams or the atmosphere may be regarded as permanent in
terms of man's life span. The sort of calculation discussed so far places
the gains to industry against the loss of amenities suffered by the
existing population only. If spillovers cause permanent damage the
losses suffered by future generations must also be brought into the
calculus. Once brought in they strengthen the case for government
intervention, rather than for negotiation between opposing groups,
and for total prohibition of the more suspect spillovers, rather than for
their reduction. 17
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
(1) Although information about the feasibility and costs of noisecontrol by engineers and information about the short- and long-term
effects of noise on the human condition by psychologists and others is
to be encouraged for obvious reasons, the decision to leave to
"specialists" the determination of a norm in respect to noise-tolerance
constitutes an arbitrary infringement of individual choice. Even if
such a norm is determined through the political process, by reference
to what is "reasonable" under a variety of circumstances, it deprives
people of choice without redress at least as much as if they were to be
"reasonably" deprived of a range of currently produced goods on the
grounds that they were not essential to people's welfare. I say at least
simply because the dependence of a person's welfare on amenity, on
17. Although the thesis of this article has been the economics of adverse spillovers, very little
modification is required once the possibility of beneficial spillover effects are introduced. The
correction of each type of spillover on its own, at least in conditions under which second-best
problems do not pose insurmountable obstacles, makes a separate allocative contribution. Only
in those cases in which the production or use of certain goods simultaneously generates both
adverse and beneficial spillovers, do we need to modify our results in an obvious way. We must
remind ourselves that spillovers are used in the sense originally defined, and do not therefore
include benefits that are, in the ordinary way, priced through the market. The major adverse
spillover effects, however, would appear to be "pure" cases.
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quiet, clean air and a more spacious environment, is likely to be
greater than the dependence of his welfare on a good deal of modern
gadgetry. Apart from equity, the allocation of "bads" is as much a
part of the economic problem as the allocation of goods; and the
precondition to any liberal solution of an allocative problem is that
people be free to exercise choice.
(2) Within the economist's universe of discourse, disamenities are
treated for all allocative purposes as adverse spillover effects that fall
on the public. The distinguishing feature of such spillover effects is
that they are produced incidentally along with marketable goods. If
we ignore "psychic" external effects ("interdependent utilities"),
which are in any case left out of all project selection criteria, the
remaining tangible spillovers, in so far as they fall on the public, can
be shown to be formally equivalent to a collective (negative) good,
though one unavoidably produced at zero cost along with private
market goods. Like a non-optional collective good, every one sharing
a collective "bad" is compelled either to bear with the amount that
falls to him or to incur costs in a bid to reduce its incidence. For there
is no technical means whereby "property rights" in the relevant
amenities can be conferred on each person, and therefore no
decentralized market dealing with the transfer of such rights can
emerge. An ideal pricing system requires, however, that the marginal
cost of these spillovers to society be added to the commercial
marginal cost in employing the standard pricing rule.
(3) Until very recently the consensus among economists was that
the optimal output of any industry generating spillover was uniquely
determined either in a partial or in a general equilibrium setting. The
optimal output could be attained by negotiation between the affected
parties, by government taxes or subsidies or by direct controls. The
choice of tax or subsidy, like the issue of which party in the conflict of
interest was to compensate the other, was held to have distributive
welfare effects only, but no effect on the optimal outcome or output.
However, the costs of negotiating and maintaining an agreed solution,
and costs incurred by governments (either in imposing direct controls,
or else in calculating and imposing a set of optimal excise taxes or
subsidies) involve real resource costs which may exceed the net
benefit of a movement from the uncorrected market output to an
optimal output. In such cases, the residual benefit is negative, and the
already existing position under the prevailing law is Pareto optimal.
(4) However, because of the existence of welfare effects (misnamed "income effects"), which can be significant in cases of
disamenity, we have to acknowledge that the maximum sum a person
will pay for the acquisition of a good (or for the removal of a "bad") is
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less than the minimum sum he will accept to forgo the good (or to
bear with the "bad"). Under either type of law the problem of
compensation arises whenever a proposed economic change is such
that some people's CV's are negative. A proposed change for which
the algebraic sum of the CV's is positive entails a potential Pareto
improvement under either law.
Caveat-The measure of CV is, inter alia, a function of the
availability of prices of substitutes. Particular care must be exercised
in using differences in the market values of property as a proxy for the
measure of compensation, since the growth of disamenity itself is
likely to reduce these differences.
The traditional view of the spillover problems, summarized in para.
3 (above), can now be challenged.
(5) Ignoring transaction costs (G), whether or not an NB is
possible, and the (optimal) size of the NB where it is possible, depend
upon the existing type of law which determines the party in the
conflict that is liable to pay for the change in question and the party
that is to receive compensation. Even though compensation is
hypothetical, its direction, and therefore the optimal outcome,
depend upon the type of law.
(6) In moving from a non-optimal to an optimal output, or to one
that is closer to optimal, a positive NB is measured as being equal to
the algebraic sum of the CV's. But we must now take account of the
real transaction costs (G) in reaching an optimal or improved position,
whether this improvement is to be brought about through direct
negotiation between the parties or through government intervention.
Subtracting these G costs from the NB yields the RB, and this can
obviously be negative while the NB is positive.
Now these real transaction costs (G) and also the measure and sign
of the RB vary with the type of law. In cases of widespread
disamenities reasons are given for sometimes expecting the RB of a
number of outputs to be lower, if not negative, under L law, as
compared with the RB under L law. In important cases we can expect
the RB of a change to an optimal output to be negative under either
law. In that event, an unchecked market output plus its accompanying spillover is Pareto justified under the L law, while under the Llaw
the zero-output and zero-disamenity outcome is also Pareto justified.
(7) Since, for the purpose of economic calculation, the adoption of
one kind of law or the other can make a substantial, and possibly
critical, difference to the outcome of any cost-benefit study, the
economist cannot hope to remain neutral. A number of considerations, allocative, distributional and ethical, speak strongly fort law as
against L law, and are reinforced by the community's growing
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awareness of some of the ecological consequences of the by-products
of modern industry and transport, and also by the irrevocability of
certain forms of social damage.
Returning to the social losses arising from noise and other adverse
side effects, there is little to add to what has been said. Some of the
pitfalls in their calculation have been uncovered. The principle of
estimating compensation to the victims of any residual disamenity as
a minimum sum required to restore their welfare has been stressed.18
But nothing has been said about practical methods for ascertaining
the numbers affected by any specific side effect and for estimating the
compensatory sums, other than a brief note on the possible uses of a
sample survey for obtaining an underestimate of the exact compensation.
For spillovers that elude calculation, or for forming some rough
idea prior to making estimates, one can always have recourse to
contingency calculations. To illustrate with an extreme example, if
the cost benefit study of an airport produced an excess benefit over
cost of some $10 million per annum, only by ignoring aircraft noise
and the possible increase in loss of life, one could still impress the
authorities with the importance of these factors by making hypothetical estimates of losses based on rough calculations of the number of
victims affected. Thus (a), if it were reckoned that about half a million
additional families could suffer in varying degrees from aircraft noise
as a result of a newly located airport, an average sum of as little as $20
per annum per family in compensation would wholly offset the excess
benefit. Again (b), if the new airport became responsible for added
road congestion in the vicinity of the airport, an average additional
delay of one hour per week affecting one million motorists would, if
valued at 20 cents an hour, wholly offset the estimated excess gain.
Similarly for loss of life and other side effects.
Even though the estimate of the number of people affected is
speculative, provided it is not implausible, the calculation of the
resulting compensatory sums necessary to offset the excess gains may
be such as to cast doubt on the economic feasibility of the project.
There would be enough doubt at any rate to delay a decision until
estimates of these less tangible factors can be made with greater
assurance.
18. It goes without saying that a government which, notwithstanding a negative cost-benefit
result, wishes to go ahead with an airport, or wishes to maintain an existing airport or airroute,
on the grounds of national defense or "the national interest" would be able to placate any
opposition and meet economic principle if it gave evidence of properly valuing the "national
interest" to the extent of being willing to compensate all victims of aircraft noise. Equity is also
served by this policy, for taxpayers as a whole are made to shoulder the costs of aircraft noise
rather than the burden being bome wholly by the victims.
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EPILOGUE
There is always a strong temptation for those engaged in costbenefit studies to come up with firm quantitative estimates, even if it
means neglecting the estimation of the more difficult spillover effects
which can fairly claim to be significant enough to alter the conclusions, if it were indeed possible to bring them into the calculus. And
since these less measurable effects are likely to be adverse spillovers,
the common response to this temptation, to yield to it, imparts a
strong bias toward favoring commercially viable projects irrespective
of their ability to withstand more searching criteria. In the new
Establishment such "positive" decisions are unfortunately apt to meet
with more approval than a verdict of "not proven." The growthfavored atmosphere of the postwar era does exert a pervasive
influence, one favoring "action" in order to meet a "challenge." The
challenge generally being the vague feeling that we must push into
the future. This influence the economist should resist, both as a matter
of professional pride and of obligation to the community he elects to
serve. 19

19. There are ample opportunities for over-stating gains as well as understating losses
especially in connection with swifter means of travel. But one important consideration is to be
borne in mind when estimating gains. With the passage of time much of the apparent gains
based on the usual calculations will turn out to be illusory. There is no evidence that faster
speeds or more available transport results in more leisure. The evidence points the other way.
Today people spend more time commuting to work than at any other period in history. There is
a marked propensity to over-respond to faster travel facilities, to raise one's expectations unduly,
and consequently to become increasingly impatient at inevitable delays. Again, business firms
may at first welcome faster travel facilities only to discover later that, like increasing
expenditure on competitive advertising, no firm ends up having a secure advantage over the
other. All have to spend more to maintain their relative shares of the market.

